There is some other confirming evidence for it in the German records. This story has the advantage of being specific enough that one can acually compare it to the opposing side's records (unlike most war stories). Furthermore, he identifies elsewhere the strength of the antitank unit as 60 planes. It this story, he clearly identifies the time and date (afternoon of July 8), the location ("from the woods east of GOSTCHEVO station"), the unit ("4th Group/9th Antitank Ground Attack Wing"), the German air response ("in a short time, they were on their way to meet the enemy force"), the duration of the battle("after about one hour") and the result ("approximately 40 tanks had been knocked out") and its effect ("the remainder of the enemy force discontinued the attack and turned around"). This story was first published by Hans Seidemann (VIII Air Corps commander at Kursk) in 1947 as part of his write-up he did for the US Army on air operations at Kursk. Bruno Meyer story about seeing a Soviet tank brigade coming out of the woods at Gostishchevo on July 8 and calling in all five squadrons of the IV/9th Ground Assualt Wing of Hs-129s B-2 (the Hs-129 armed with the 30mm cannon) and halting the attack by destroying 40-50 Soviet tanks in a short time.Īs the Bruno Meyer story is better documented, I will address it first (and like many of my posts this may take several days).
First is the Rudel story that on or about 7 July he personally killed 12 tanks with the new experimental Ju-87 G-1 (the Stuka with the 37mm cannons) and this lead to the formation and use of the tank busting stuka squadrons. There are two seperate stories of German tank busting that circulate about Kursk. Nearing completion of this section in my book, I am now prepared to discuss it. I have been asked over the year(s) by Niklas Zetterling, Jeff Duquette and others about the particular stories about the effectiveness of the Hs-129 B-2s and Ju-87 G-1s in tank busting, particularly on July 8.
Profile | register | preferences | faq | search There were even designs for an Amerika bomber that could reach New York, but that objective was also never realised.Tank Busting Aircraft at Kursk - The Dupuy Institute Forum Belated attempts to get a range of new four-engined aircraft into service failed, and only one – the Heinkel He 177 – saw action. Germany's lack of a strategic bomber force to hit back at British and Soviet industry was keenly felt as the war progressed. The Luftwaffe's prime function would be to support the army over the battlefield. Instead, priority was given to smaller aircraft, especially dive-bombers. In Germany however, Wever's death – and a lack of resources – saw the abandonment of existing projects for a long-range bomber. It was an idea which had gained ground in Britain, where new heavy bombers were being designed for RAF Bomber Command. He had been Germany's principal advocate of strategic bombing – defeating an enemy country through the systematic attack on its economy and population. In 1936 the Chief of Staff of the new Luftwaffe, General Walther Wever, was killed in an air crash. The Maginot Line was quickly outflanked, and French forces caught off balance by the speed of the German advance. As expected, Hitler’s forces invaded neutral Belgium, but the focus of the attack was through the undefended Ardennes forest. The Maginot Line was seen as a sensible way to maximise the military potential of a limited number of troops, but it also reflected France's static, defensive mentality which was exploited by Nazi Germany in May 1940. The line was only partially extended north of this because it was assumed that any future German invasion attempt would be met and defeated in Belgium, hopefully with British assistance. Built between 19, and named after a French defence minister, the line was a complex network of fortresses, bunkers, obstacles and artillery positions along France's border with Switzerland, Germany and Luxembourg. The Maginot line was the French response to German rearmament in violation of the Treaty of Versailles.
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